EUROCULTURE: COMMUNICATIONS, COMMUNITY, AND IDENTITY IN EUROPE

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I. INTRODUCTION

> Once a nation and a culture have been centralized by a solid historical process, they experience insurmountable difficulties when they attempt either to create viable sub-units or to integrate themselves into some coherent larger entity . . . . Hence the difficulties currently being encountered in the attempt to find a European spirit and culture, a European dynamism. Inability to produce a federal event (Europe), a local event (decentralization), a racial event (multiracialism). Too entangled by our history, we can only produce an apologetic centralism (a Clochemerle pluralism) and an apologetic mixing (our soft racism).
>
> Jean Baudrillard[1]

Europe is not just a geographical site; it is also an idea inextricably linked with the myths of Western civilization and grievously shaped by the haunting encounter with its colonial "Other." The year 1992 was not only about the "great market" and the single European economy, but also about harnessing a European spirit, culture, and dynamism.

This article is concerned not only with the European cultural agenda and its ideals, but also with its repressions and pathologies. The focus will be on the relationship between communication, culture, and community. Implications of new global communications industries and technologies must be considered

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[1] JEAN BAUDRILLARD, AMERICA 83 (Chris Turner trans., 1988) (1986).

in light of their impact on European cultural identities and attachments. To adequately understand cultural change and cultural fixity, however, there must be a broader approach to the subject.

The central focus of this essay is on questions of, and the interrelationship between, geography and history. The historical continuities and discontinuities in European development, the historical traditions as they are invented and reinvented, and the cultural inheritance and heritage associated with "European civilization" are the main concerns of this article. The significance of the geographical dimensions of change in the present period, reconfigurations of place and territory, new forms of spatial orientation and referentiality, and the changing meanings and senses of community, will also be considered. Since any discussion of communication and culture must inevitably raise the question of power, this will also be at the heart of our inquiry. We must consider the relationship between geographies, histories, and powers—that Professor Harold Adams Innis referred to as the "problem of empire."[2]

A. *Communication, Culture, and Identity*

The expanding empires of communications moguls like Rupert Murdoch, Leo Kirch, and Silvio Berlusconi are undeniably potent forces in the world. It is not surprising that many observers attribute to them absolute power in the field of communications. Richard Peet argues that "[t]he tendency is towards the production of one world mind, one world culture, and the consequent disappearance of regional consciousness flowing from the local specificities of the human past."[3] The global media captures the hearts and minds of their audiences, thereby producing an increasingly homogeneous global consciousness and culture. According to Peet, we are now in an era of "ultra-culture," in which the world's people have been transformed into latent cogs in the capitalist production and consumption machine.[4]

We take as a given the power and influence of transnational media conglomerates. The significant question is how we view the functioning and effectiveness of the power of these media conglomerates. What is the nature of the relationship between

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[2] *See generally* HAROLD A. INNIS, EMPIRE AND COMMUNICATIONS (1950).

[3] Richard Peet, *The Destruction of Regional Cultures*, *in* A WORLD IN CRISIS?: GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 150, 169 (R.J. Johnston & P.J. Taylor eds., 1986).

[4] Richard Peet, *International Capital, International Culture*, *in* THE GEOGRAPHY OF MULTINATIONALS 275, 298 (Michael Taylor & Nigel Thrift eds., 1982).

communication, culture, and identity in terms of the impact of new communication technologies upon culture and cultural identities? The prevailing view finds that these relationships contain varying degrees of technological determinism.

Richard Peet's prediction of the creation of a world-synthetic consciousness and culture by the global communications industries is premised upon such relationships.[5] Such a formulation, however, is fraught with difficulties because the power of the media is assumed, but never demonstrated. This assumption is grounded in a model process called the transmission view of communication.[6] Within this model, communications technologies are the active and determining forces, while culture and identity are passive and reactive.[7] Communications technologies are the causal forces, and cultural identities are the effects that are shaped and modified by the impact of the technologies. It is also the case—which will be a major focus of the subsequent discussion—that there is no theoretical understanding of cultural identity within this perspective: cultural identity is a black box.

The real issue is the vulnerability of cultural identity to attack from the exogenous forces of foreign communications empires. The problem is one of resisting cultural invasion and fortifying indigenous identity. Change is seen as a matter of cultural erosion, even extinction. The great fear is that positive national identities are being replaced by a global non-identity.[8]

This kind of thinking is also apparent in those strategies which, in response to the perceived threat of "coca-colonization," seek to sustain and defend a sense of European identity—such strategies which easily succumb to a protective "Fortress Europe" mentality.[9]

Cultural identity is seen as both non-problematic and residual. In order to really understand the relation between communication, culture, and identity, we must move beyond the deterministic model of the communication process. Within this prevailing framework, cultural identities can only be reactive to the controlling stimulus of communications technologies. A better formulation of the problem is needed: one that views cultural identity as problematic and central.

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[5] *See* Peet, *The Destruction of Regional Cultures*, *supra* note 3.

[6] *Id.* at 168.

[7] *Id.*

[8] *See id.*

[9] *See generally* Etienne Balibar, *Es Gibt Keinen Staat in Europa: Racism and Politics in Europe Today*, 186 NEW LEFT REV. 5 (1991).

As Philip Schlesinger argues in the context of a discussion of national identity:

> [W]e now need to turn around the terms of the conventional argument: *not* to start with communication and its supposed effects on national identity and culture, but rather to begin by posing the problem of national identity itself, to ask how it might be analysed, and what importance communicative practices might play in its constitution.[10]

The challenge is to understand how social and cultural identities are constituted and to consider the parameters within which these identities and orientations might now be reconstituted. Recognizing the importance of cultural identity as a starting point, better theoretical and political questions concerning the power and potential of new communications technologies may be asked.

Our concern is with a collective cultural identity. The static and fixed conceptions are supported by the dominant communication model. We need to develop an alternative that emphasizes the active, dynamic, and contested nature of collective identities. A collective identity involves the achievement, by individual actors or by social groups, of a certain coherence, cohesion, and continuity. Such bonding will always be provisional and more or less precarious.[11] As Alberto Melucci argues:

> Collective identity formation is a delicate process and requires continual investments. As it comes to resemble more institutionalized forms of social action, collective identity may crystallize into organizational forms, a system of formal rules, and patterns of leadership. In less institutionalized forms of action its character more closely resembles a process which must be continually activated in order for action to be possible.[12]

The cohesion of a collective identity must be sustained through time, a collective memory, shared traditions, and the sense of a common past and heritage. In addition, it must be maintained across space, through a complex mapping of territories and frontiers, and through principles of inclusion and exclusion that define "us" against "them." At certain moments, the established and normative bases of collective identity enter into

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10 Philip Schlesinger, *On National Identity: Some Conceptions and Misconceptions Criticized*, *in* 26 SOC. SCI. INFO. 219, 234 (1987).

11 *See* ALBERTO MELUCCI, NOMADS OF THE PRESENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND INDIVIDUAL NEEDS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 34 (John Keane & Paul Mier eds., 1989).

12 *Id.* at 34-35.

crisis. Coherence and continuity are threatened by fragmentation and discontinuity. The emotional investments that inform the sense of identity are tempered. The year 1992 was a symbolic date that identified one such critical moment. The question is how will this crisis be managed: whether regressively, through the reassertion of traditional identities and allegiances, or progressively, through newly imagined forms of cohesion and collectivity.

B. *Postmodern Geographies*

Advanced capitalist societies are in a period of profound structural transformation. This process is difficult and cannot be generally addressed here. This transformation, however, is characterized by quite contradictory developments and by a complex interweaving of change and continuity. While some believe that the shape of things to come is already clear, this article argues that the course of change is not obvious, not determined, and not yet decided. The new order is yet to be invented and remains a contested matter.

Our particular concern is with the geographical dynamics of this restructuring process. In their development, capitalist societies have used space as part of their strategies for growth and competition.[13] This has involved an historical succession of spatial structures of production, each associated with "new sets of relations between activities in different places, new spatial patterns of social organisation, new dimensions of inequality and new relations of dominance and dependence."[14]

There has been a complex interplay between the functional logic of corporate organizational structure and the territorial logic of particular places.[15] As Professor Ray Hudson argues, "there is a reciprocal relationship between the restructuring of capital, changing spatial divisions of labour and the specificities of localities."[16] If there have been significant discontinuities,

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[13] DOREEN MASSEY, SPATIAL DIVISIONS OF LABOR: SOCIAL STRUCTURES AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF PRODUCTION 8 (1984). In her book about industry, Massey explains that "new spatial divisions of labour are also more than just new patterns, [they are] a kind of geographical re-shuffling of the same old pack of cards." *Id.*

[14] *Id.*

[15] *Id.* at 9. "[C]hanges in the spatial structure of the labour force [bring about changes in] . . . industry's choice of location . . . [and] enormous reorganisations of the geographical form. All this has had dramatic effects on particular places. In some the previous economic base has been removed." *Id.*

[16] Ray Hudson, *Uneven Development in Capitalist Societies: Changing Spatial Divisions of Labour, Forms of Spatial Organization of Production and Service Provision, and Their Impact on Localities*, 13 TRANSACTION INST. OF BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 484, 493 (1988).

there have also been forms of continuity and cumulativeness in this historical process. Meanings, traditions, attachments, and allegiances accrue around what is known as the sense of place. Patterns of economic and political organization, and of power and dependency, are inscribed in the relations between particular locales, such as cities, regions, and nations.

While the final outcome of geographical restructuring and reconfiguration remains uncertain, some key elements of the process can already be identified. What appears to be emerging is a new articulation of spatial scales—global, national, and local spheres—associated with the increasing transnationalization of accumulation. The worldwide organization and integration of corporate activities is bringing about a more immediate and direct articulation of global and local spaces. Particular localities and cities are drawn into the logic of transnational networks. Advanced forms of globalization

> involve the strategic creation of linked production complexes, each appropriate to a diverse mix of regional and social endowments, distributed as an interregional network in accordance with a global strategic conception. . . . [The viability of regional economies becomes] a product of their ability to articulate a coherent organisational presence within a global milieu.[17]

A new global network and matrix of unevenly developed regions, cities, and localities seems to be developing through this process. In the context of this global-local interface, economic and political governance at the national scale becomes increasingly problematic. As political commentator and author David Held argues, "the internationalisation of production, finance and other economic resources is unquestionably eroding the capacity of the [nation] state to control its own economic future."[18] The processes being described are economic, political, and cultural. In addition, these processes have enormous resonance for collective organization and identity in the late twentieth century.

The fundamental principles of political attachment in capitalist societies have been national and nationalist identities, implicit in citizenship of the nation state. This allegiance is now being increasingly undermined. The resurgence of national-pop-

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[17] R. Gordon, *Les Entrepreneurs, l'Entreprise et les Fondements Sociaux de L'Innovation*, 30 SOCIOLOGIE DU TRAVAIL 107, 116 (1989).

[18] David Held, *Farewell Nation State*, MARXISM TODAY (London) Dec. 1988, at 12, 13 (discussing four "disjunctures" or gaps between the theoretical power of the sovereign nation-state and the realities of the contemporary global system).

ulist ideologies in the 1980s is a response to this tendency. We are seeing the emergence of both enlarged conceptions of citizenship, such as in continental Europe, as well as restricted conceptions of citizenship, such as in local, regional, and provincial factions seeking nation-state status. New forms of bonding, belonging, and involvement are being forged out of the global-local nexus. It is much more difficult to create and sustain a sense of internationalism. Consequently, the prevailing tendency is toward a new or renewed localism. The question is whether such affiliations will be conservative, parochial, and introspective, or whether it is possible to reimagine local communities in more ecumenical and cosmopolitan terms.[19]

Some of the cultural dimensions of this global-local dynamic are reflected in the practices and theories of postmodernism. Space and place have been central to postmodern sensibilities and identities.[20] According to Edward Soja, "the contemporary period of restructuring has been accompanied by an accentuated visibility and consciousness of spatiality and spatialization, regionalization and regionalism."[21]

In one form of postmodernism, the emphasis is on the nature and experience of the new spatiality produced by international communications and image networks. There is a global space of image, screen, and surface in which real and imaginary orders become fused. Experiencing a space of absolute proximity and instantaneity may cause disorientation, dislocation, and fragmentation. Alternatively, the experience may show that disorientation and fragmentation may be accepted as a new kind of authenticity.

In another form of postmodernism, this overwhelming sense and experience of space is negotiated defensively by invoking the spirit of place. This strategy looks to the re-enchantment of place and community, and to the restoration of meaning, rootedness, and human proportions to place. Such developments can be seen, for example, in neo-vernacular and neo-historicist forms of architecture, design, and urban planning. Developments in

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19 *See* Kevin Robins, *Reimagined Communities: European Image Spaces, Beyond Fordism*, 3 CULTURAL STUD. 145 (1989).

20 *See* EDWARD W. SOJA, POSTMODERN GEOGRAPHIES: THE REASSERTION OF SPACE IN CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY 173 (1989). "[A]ll progressive social forces—feminism, the 'Greens', the peace movement, organized and disorganized labour, movements for national liberation and for radical urban and regional change [must] become consciously and explicitly spatial movements as well. For the left, this is the postfordist and postmodern regional challenge." *Id.*

21 *Id.*

place and community may also be found in the postmodern recuperation of heritage and history.[22] Although they appear to be quite contradictory, both of these currents of postmodernism are, in fact, sustained by shared concerns. Both offer different responses to the same fundamental question of bearings and identity in the new global space.

So far, the relevance of technology in the formation of postmodern geographies has not yet been considered. While they should not be seen as the determinant and causal factor, new communications technologies undoubtedly are playing a powerful role in the emergence of new spatial structures, relations, and orientations. Corporate communications networks have produced a global space of electronic information flows. The new media conglomerates are creating a global image space: a " 'space of transmission' [that] cuts across—as a new geographic entity, which has its own sovereignty, its own guarantors—the geographies of power, of social life, and of knowledge, which define the space of nationality or culture."[23]

The communications media makes possible a new kind of relationship between place and space. Through their capacity to transgress frontiers and subvert territories, they are implicated in a complex interplay of de-territorialization and re-territorialization. Particularly significant is the transformed relationship between boundary and space. Boundaries, borders, and frontiers no longer define and distinguish relationships between place and space. The very idea of boundary—the frontier boundary of the nation state, for example, or the physical boundaries of urban structures—has been rendered problematic, although it has certainly not been erased.[24] The boundary has become a permeable "osmotic membrane" through which information and communication pass.[25]

Global media information networks and "satellite footprints" also lay an abstract space over concrete territorial configurations.[26] Consequently, older communities and their lo-

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22 *See generally* ENTERPRISE AND HERITAGE: CROSSCURRENTS OF NATIONAL CULTURE (J. Corner & S. Harvey eds., 1991).

23 CLAUS-DIETER RATH, *The Invisible Network: Television as an Institution in Everyday Life*, *in* TELEVISION IN TRANSITION, 199, 203 (Phillip Drummond & Richard Paterson eds., Phillip Drummond trans., 1985) (discussing a specific televised program aired in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland that involved the audience in solving a crime as an illustration of how the unique medium of television actually creates reality).

24 *See* SOJA, *supra* note 20, at 173.

25 Paul Virilio, *The Overexposed City*, 1 ZONE 14 (Astrid Mast ed. & trans., 1987).

26 *Id.* at 23.

calized senses are disturbed.[27] The question, therefore, is how network and community can be reconciled. What does community mean in this highly mediated world?

II. The Frontiers of European Community

> If we were beginning the European Community all over again, we should begin with culture.
>
> Jean Monnet

> All this, therefore, raises a central and neglected question: Where do non-white Europeans fall within such a vision?
>
> Yasmin Alibhai[28]

The focus thus shifts to the implications of these various media developments for Europe. In the context of these transformations, European geographies are being significantly reconfigured. What are the cultural aspects of this restructuring process? What are the implications for European cultural identities? What are the possible forms of community that might emerge?

Europe has to position itself within a new international order. European integration is occurring in response to the economic power of the United States and Japan, to the emerging challenge of the so-called newly industrializing countries of Southeast Asia and Latin America, and also to the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe. A strategic response must be found to a new hypermobile capital that has broken national bounds and undermined national sovereignties. Sense must be made of the information grids and image spaces that are increasingly creating new transnational communication spheres, markets, and communities.

What forms of political governance and regulation can flourish in these changing circumstances? There is a conservative solution that preserves the nation-state and maintains the integrity of national frontiers. Enoch Powell articulates a position that still has considerable support in British Conservative thought: "This is not a Europe 'without frontiers.' Nations have frontiers; and a Europe, Mrs. Thatcher's Europe, of 'independent sovereign nations,' will be a Europe of frontiers."[29]

However, a more imaginative and forward-looking strategy

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[27] *Id.*

[28] Yasmin Alibhai, *Community Whitewash*, The Guardian, Jan. 23, 1989, at 38.

[29] Enoch Powell, *Sovereignty We Won't Surrender*, The Guardian, Apr. 1989, at 17.

beyond frontiers does exist. Inherent in the concept of a European Community is an aspiration for transnational regulation through the formation of a multinational bloc. As yet, it is a precarious idea. The question is whether this vision can be directed toward emancipatory ends, or whether it will produce a European superstate.[30] Contrasting projections of, on the one hand, "a social Europe,"[31] and on the other, the protectionism, statism, and militarism of a "Fortress Europe,"[32] exemplifies the ambiguous potential.

What then does "community" mean? As Eileen and Stephen Yeo emphasize, community is a " 'contested concept.' "[33] Historically, community has had a range of meanings: community as mutuality, community as service, and, more recently, community as state.[34] It is this latter sense—abstract and coercive, in which the ideal of community is made to coincide with state authority—that threatens to prevail in the 1990s.

A. *The Community of Culture*

> European culture is marked by its diversity: diversity of climate, countryside, architecture, language, beliefs, taste and artistic style. Such diversity must be protected, not diluted. It represents one of the chief sources of the wealth of our continent. But underlying this variety there is an affinity, a family likeness, a common European identity. Down the ages, the tension between the continent's cultural diversity and unity has helped to fuse ancient and modern, traditional and progressive. It is undoubtedly a source of the greatness of the best elements of our civilization.[35]

Culture is at the very heart of the European project. It was seen as absolutely fundamental to the "completi[on] [of] the internal market by 1992"[36] and to the ulterior objective of European Union. Culture is "the basis of European Union, *which has goals other than mere economic and social integration*, however impor-

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30 *See* Balibar, *supra* note 9. "The state today in Europe is *neither national nor supranational*, and this ambiguity does not slacken but only grows deeper over time." *Id.* at 16.

31 *Id.* at 17.

32 *See id.* at 16 n.6.

33 Eileen Yeo & Stephen Yeo, *On the Uses of 'Community': From Owenism to the Present*, *in* NEW VIEWS OF CO-OPERATION, 229, 230 (Stephen Yeo ed., 1988).

34 *Id.* at 231.

35 The Community and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, EUROPEAN FILE, (CEC) Mar. 1983, at 1.

36 A Fresh Boost for Culture in the European Community, COM(87)603 at 1 [hereinafter A Fresh Boost for Culture].

tant this may be."[37] European cultural identity "is one of the prerequisites for that solidarity which is vital if the advent of the large market, and the considerable change it will bring about in living conditions within the Community, is to secure the popular support it needs."[38] This concern with culture reflects an increasing awareness of the "inter-relationship between the economy, technology and culture."[39] It is emphasized that "[i]nformation, communication and culture are all bound up with one another in that the creation of a large market establishes a European area based on common cultural roots as well as social and economic realities."[40] The Commission invokes the richness and solemnity of "a common cultural heritage characterized by dialogues and exchanges between peoples and men of culture based on democracy, justice and liberty."[41] This heritage is "deeply rooted in the collective consciousness of its inhabitants."[42] What also runs as a *leitmotif* through the European documentation is the theme of "unity in diversity." The seemingly paradoxical appeal is to "[t]he unity of European culture as revealed by the history of regional and national cultural diversity."[43]

New communications technologies—particularly advanced consumer television—are seen as fundamental to the evolution of this destiny. The Commission emphasizes that the electronics, aerospace, telecommunications, and audiovisual industries will constitute major growth sectors in the 1990s.[44] In the case of the audiovisual industries, developing a European technology and production base will be necessary in order to meet the challenge from external competitors.[45] The Commission also stressed that a common market for broadcasting, particularly one that promotes the free flow of what is called commercial speech, should contribute to the achievement of an internal market for all goods and services.[46] But, again, the overriding insistence is on the harmonious relationship between industrial and cultural renaissance. Television may be important in "promoting the cultural

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37 *Id.* (emphasis added).
38 *Id.*
39 *Id.*
40 *Id.* at 3.
41 *Id.* at 1.
42 *Id.*
43 *Id.* at 3.
44 *Towards a Large Audio-Visual Market*, EUROPEAN FILE, (Commission of the European Communities), Feb. 1988, at 3-4.
45 *Id.* at 4.
46 A Fresh Boost for Culture, *supra* note 36, at 3.

identity of Europe."[47] Furthermore, television can also "help to develop a people's Europe through reinforcing the sense of belonging to a Community composed of countries which are different yet partake of a deep solidarity."[48] Television can actually be an instrument of integration. The Commission maintains that "[t]elevision will play an important part in developing and nurturing awareness of the rich variety of Europe's common cultural and historical heritage. The dissemination of information across national borders can do much to help the peoples of Europe to recognise the common destiny they share in many areas."[49]

What is this vision of Europe and its heritage? The European Commission is seeking to revitalize and reactivate a sense of European identity associated with the heritage of Western civilization. In a period when President Mitterrand can fear that a European will be defined as someone who watches American soap operas on a Japanese television set, the importance of the Greco-Roman cultural tradition is being ideologically mobilized.[50] A common history and destiny grounded in the "moral, political, [aesthetic] and technological superiority"[51] of the European continent is invoked. "The present push for European economic . . . political [and cultural] unity is an attempt to refurbish the old image of princess Europa as wealthy, free and powerful."[52] Although this resurgent appeal to a common culture and identity[53] and to the collective consciousness of European citizens is unsurprising, its contemporary implications are troublesome. It is difficult to see the relevance of this rear-view sense of grandeur for any significant relocation of Europe in a changing world, and for any genuine and meaningful reimagination of European identity.

A key issue in this context concerns our response to current upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe. How will a "Europe without frontiers" deal with the Soviet call for a "common European home?" How will it confront the boundaries, real and im-

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47 *Towards a Large European Audio-Visual Market*, *supra* note 44, at 4.

48 *Id.*

49 Television Without Frontiers: Green Paper on the Establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting, Especially by Satellite and Cable, COM 300 final (1984) [hereinafter Television Without Frontiers].

50 *See* John Keane, *Identikit Europe*, MARXISM TODAY, Apr. 1989, at 31.

51 *Id.* at 30. The "moral, political and technological superiority" now invoked is the one, Keane argues, that was the generally accepted view of Europe in the eighteenth century. *Id.*

52 *Id.*

53 See *id.* for a discussion of the recent notion of a unified "Europe" in light of the continent's violent and fragmented past.

aginary, between East and West? There are great difficulties regarding the manner in which these two Europes will relate. Milan Kundera points to the geographical and historical divisions.[54] Western Europe "perceives in Central Europe nothing but a political regime. . . . [I]t sees in Central Europe only Eastern Europe."[55] At the same time, Central Europeans define their own identities in terms of Western civilization and heritage. "For [Eastern Europe], the word 'Europe' does not represent a phenomenon of geography but a spiritual notion synonymous with the word 'West.' "[56] Ironically, their belief is that Western Europe "no longer perceives its unity as a cultural unity;"[57] that it is no longer bound by "supreme values."[58]

How will the European Community come to terms with this other Europe, this "lost" Europe? How might these different worlds, different Europes, enter into dialogue? Is it possible to expand the sense of collective and cultural identity to embrace both Europes?[59] The past weighs heavily on such aspirations. It is difficult to accept, "as Eurocratic optimists apparently do at present, that we can invent a new, humane cultural identity *ex nihilo* and leave all the nasty bits out. Often, if not invariably, the skeletons in the cupboard persist in rattling."[60] This is not to say that the ideal is empty, but that its fulfillment will require political maturity and magnanimity.[61]

Within the European Community there are skeletons too: histories and memories that must be exorcised. If the idea of "unity in diversity" is to be more than a bland slogan, it will require the political will to confront the legacy of old systems of power, inequality, and disadvantage. James Donald identifies a logic that has been at work in shaping the political and cultural map of Europe: "[C]ulture can be seen as a field in which the forces of identity, standard speech, and the state exert a centripe-

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54 Milan Kundera, *A Kidnapped West or Culture Bows Out*, 11 GRANTA 93 (Edmond White trans., 1984).

55 *Id.* at 118.

56 *Id.* at 95.

57 *Id.* at 110.

58 *Id.* Kundera posits that in the modern era culture replaced religion as the "expression of the supreme values by which European humanity understands itself," and that culture is now bowing out. *Id.*

59 Philip Schlesinger, *Cold Sore for Minimalists and Maximalists*, THE TIMES (London), Jan. 13, 1989, Higher Education Supp., at 15.

60 *Id.*

61 *Id.* To achieve the goal of uniting "two armed camps" of Europe into a " 'common European home,' " it will be necessary to heed the "dangers of Eurocentrism." *Id.* Thus, "it is extremely important not to transfer enmity on to another plane and to exclude the world outside." *Id.*

tal pull against the centrifugal forces of cultural difference, linguistic variation, and carnival."[62] Cultural diversity and homogeneity have been circumscribed by the forces of centralization, standardization, and unity.[63] Hitherto, it has been in the form of the nation-state that this containing principle has been most highly developed. In the process, living but stateless cultures have been marginalized and have struggled to survive. What is perceived as the rich tapestry of European cultural diversity is, in reality, a system of territorial and cultural hierarchies shaped through the power of the nation state.[64]

The key question is whether European integration will take us beyond the logic of the nation-state and whether it will, as the European Commission supposes, stimulate a new and more egalitarian cultural geography. What role might the new communications technologies play in this process? The answer to these questions is, of course, far from clear. What we must not simply assume is that, because they transcend national territories, the new communications media will automatically erode the authority of the nation-state and open the way for new and varied forms of internationalism and regionalism.[65] On the contrary, the danger is that the centripetal/centrifugal dynamic described by James Donald[66] may, in fact, occur at a higher level, with a European mega-state as the centralizing and containing force. Ironically, in this case, we might find ourselves defending national cultures as the basis of cultural diversity and, albeit reluctantly, supporting national sovereignty as a bulwark against global standardization and homogenization. The next question is whether it is possible to transcend this nation-state logic, to move beyond the nationalistic assumption of a normative congruence of policy and culture, and to re-imagine a new form of human community in which polity and culture are decoupled.[67] A genuine and radical cultural diversity would entail the more fundamental, and perhaps utopian, project of deconstructing this logic of containment, rather than simply and defensively reconstructing it at higher levels.

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62 James Donald, *How English Is It? Popular Literature and National Culture*, 6 NEW FORMATIONS 31, 33 (1988).

63 *Id.* at 32.

64 *Id.*

65 *See* CLAUS-DIETER RATH, TELEVISION IN TRANSITION 199 (Phillip Drummond & Richard Paterson eds., 1984).

66 *See* Donald, *supra* note 62.

67 *See* RICHARD COLLINS, *National Culture: A Contradiction in Terms?*, *in* TELEVISION: POLICY AND CULTURE 199, 200 (July 20-22, 1988) (paper presented to the International Television Studies Conference, London).

B. *Imaginary America*

"Europe can no longer be understood by starting out from Europe itself," writes Jean Baudrillard.[68] Europe must accommodate America by coming to terms with the "imaginary" America and with the specter of Americanization.[69] America plays a complicated part in the constitution of European identity. In one respect, America is anti-Europe in that it is "mobilized as the paradigm of the traditionless, the land of the material not the cultural."[70] Yet, on the other hand, America is Europe's alter ego, an exaggerated reflection of what Europe will become, or perhaps what Europe already is. "[A] country with no past and therefore no real culture, [America has become] a paradigm for the future threatening every advanced industrial democracy in the western world."[71]

Milan Kundera's views on the relationship between Central and Western Europe provide some understanding of these conflicting attitudes.[72] At a time when "beloved Europe" appears to have abandoned culture as the realm of supreme values, *Mitteleuropa*[73] asserts itself as the repository for Western civilization. "[T]hey are desperately trying to restore the past, the past of culture, the past of the modern era. It is only in that period, only in a world that maintains a cultural dimension, that Central Europe can still defend its identity, still be seen for what it is."[74] The drama of Central European identity, with its "long meditations on the possible end of European humanity,"[75] evokes a fundamental insecurity.

> Thus it was in this region of small nations who have "not yet perished" that Europe's vulnerability, all of Europe's vulnerability, was more clearly visible before anywhere else. Actually, in our modern world where power has a tendency to become more and more concentrated in the hands of a few big countries, *all* European nations run the risk of becoming small nations and of sharing their fate. In this sense the destiny of Central Europe anticipates the destiny of Europe in general,

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68 BAUDRILLARD, *supra* note 1, at 98.

69 *See id.* at 98-99.

70 DUNCAN WEBSTER, LOOKA YONDER! THE IMAGINARY AMERICA OF POPULIST CULTURE 180 (1988).

71 DICK HEBDIGE, HIDING IN THE LIGHT: ON IMAGES AND THINGS 52-53 (1988).

72 *See* Kundera, *supra* note 54.

73 *See generally* Schlesinger, *supra* note 59.

74 *See* Kundera, *supra* note 54, at 118.

75 *Id.* at 109.

and its culture assumes an enormous relevance.[76]

The same vulnerability is apparent in the responses of the European nations to the great America of anti-culture. Here, too, there is a fight against "the subtle, relentless pressure of time, which is leaving the era of culture in its wake."[77] An "Americanized" future is set against the values and traditions by which Europeans understand and identify themselves. European identity must come to terms with that sense of threat and loss.

The real issues concern the notion of a European identity in a changing world, and America's role as a vehicle for defensively containing the European identity. Change and disruption are projected onto an imaginary America. In the process, traditional and conservative ideals of European and national identity are reinforced. This strategy is akin to what is described by psychoanalysts as projective identification.[78] An aspect of European identity, split off and projected outward, may take the form of "a benign defense which simply wishes to postpone confrontation with some experience that cannot yet be tolerated."[79] Alternatively, projective identification can take a more trenchant form that "aims really to *disavow* identification, and perhaps would be better called projective *dis*identification."[80] The consequence is that the crisis of European culture is never directly confronted. And America, as the container of that "experience that cannot yet be tolerated,"[81] assumes a fantasy dimension that always threatens to contaminate or overwhelm European cultural integrity.

Of course, we are not suggesting that American culture is only powerful in fantasy. The United States is paramount in the media and communications industries. As Raymond Williams bluntly stated, the new communications media is "reaching out to remake consciousness in [its] own images, and [is] scoring many successes."[82] Thus, cultural power and domination in the contemporary world must be seriously considered. First, how-

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76 *Id.*

77 *Id.* at 118.

78 JAMES S. GROTSTEIN, SPLITTING AND PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION 123-67 (1981). Projective identification is a defensive mechanism of the paranoid-schizoid personality and is used to defend against persecutory anxiety. It involves the disavowal of identification and the translocation of self or aspects of self. *Id.*

79 *Id.* at 131.

80 *Id.*

81 *Id.*

82 RAYMOND WILLIAMS, RESOURCES OF HOPE: CULTURE, DEMOCRACY, SOCIALISM 311 (1989).

ever, the systematic illusions and self-deceptions which distort an understanding of "Americanization" must be confronted. A precondition to this confrontation is that the behavior that has been repeated throughout the years, that has characterized European discourse on its imaginary America, is no longer repeated.

American culture is not irresistible. Thus, in the case of television production, there is evidence to suggest that "US programmes do not overwhelm foreign audiences."[83] In the larger European countries, at least, the "most popular . . . domestic programmes consistently outperform the leading US ones."[84]

Michael Tracey suggests that the international communications system is more complex than it is usually considered to be, and that there has been a gross underestimation of "[t]he strengths of national cultures, the power of language and tradition, the force that flows, still, within national boundaries."[85] In addition, European audiences are more discriminating than is generally acknowledged. "US [television] was never as popular, or even widespread as was assumed; . . . national populations basically prefer national programming . . . ."[86] And, when they do watch American programming, European audiences are less susceptible than most suppose them to be. Recent research has pointed to the quite varied ways in which audiences from different cultural backgrounds use, perceive, and interpret programs in light of the cultural resources and filters at their disposal.[87] The transmission model of the communication process has been powerfully criticized from a number of theoretical perspectives. Research that has situated audiences in everyday contexts has tended to emphasize the active appropriation and negotiation of media messages.

Although American culture is not irresistible, American culture may be scandalously appealing and desirable. Thus, willing consumers have not seen American culture as monolithic and homogeneous. Rather,

> American popular culture—Hollywood films, advertising images, packaging, clothes and music—offers a rich iconogra-

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[83] D. Waterman, *World Television Trade: The Economic Effects of Privatisation and New Technology*, 12 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 141, 144 (1988).

[84] *Id.* at 144.

[85] Michael Tracey, *Popular Culture and the Economics of Global Television*, 16 INTERMEDIA 9, 22 (1988).

[86] *Id.* at 24.

[87] *See id.* at 21-23.

> phy, a set of symbols, objects and artefacts [sic] which can be assembled and re-assembled by different groups in a literally limitless number of combinations. And the meaning of each selection is transformed as individual objects—jeans, rock records, Tony Curtis hair styles, bobby socks, etc.—are taken out of their original historical and cultural contexts and juxtaposed against other signs from other sources.[88]

Like it or not, vulgar American products—streamlined, plastic, and glamorous—have been attractive to European audiences and have made genuine connections with their tastes and desires. For these audiences, America has functioned as a positive symbol in stark contrast to traditional and class-based notions of discreet taste. Perhaps the problem is not really about a brash and material American culture, but rather about a fake antique Europe.

It may be that the real problem we must confront concerns the alleged "common cultural heritage," the "collective consciousness" shared by the inhabitants of Europe. How substantial is this? "In Paris, even in a completely cultivated milieu," rues the sentimental Kundera, "during dinner parties people discuss television programmes, not *revues*. For culture has already bowed out."[89] Kundera is right in suggesting that traditional European art and culture have lost the capacity to forge European cultural unity.[90] But he is wrong to say that culture is dead. Culture is being transformed. The mass media is becoming increasingly significant; the line between "high-brow" and "low-brow" culture is becoming thin. American cultural products are at the heart of this process. What is now being acknowledged, in some quarters, is that this has profound implications for traditional aesthetic criteria.[91] Not only is a notion of aesthetic value emerging that wholly escapes the "modern" idea of art and literature, but a new audience of this new aesthetic should emerge as well.[92]

We, in Europe, need to come to terms with this postmodern, and for some post-cultural, aesthetic and its implications for European identities. Rather than a defensively moralistic position,

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88 *See* HEBDIGE, *supra* note 71, at 74.

89 Kundera, *supra* note 54, at 117.

90 *Id.* (arguing that Central Europe is fighting a losing battle to restore the past since Europe itself is in the process of losing its cultural identity).

91 Umberto Eco, *Innovation and Repetition: Between Modern and Post-Modern Aesthetics*, 114 DAEDALUS 161, 180-81 (1985).

92 *Id.* at 181. This "new aesthetic sensibility [is] much more archaic, and truly post-post-modern. . . . [W]e ought to conceive of a new audience that feels perfectly comfortable with such a [rigidly formalistic] criterion." *Id.* at 180-81.

Europe needs a creative and open stance toward American culture. American culture moves frontiers: social, cultural, linguistic, and national.[93] Europeans must recognize that "American films, best-selling books, weeklies and dailies were in a way 'European' long before any European media."[94] America is now part of a European cultural repertoire, and an internal part of European identity.

C. *Europe and Its Others*

America may be a source of discomfort, but there is something more disturbing for Euroculture, something eating at the soul of European identity. There is, writes Yasmin Alibhai, "a respectable xenophobia mushrooming all over the continent that is pushing some of the collective dreams for 1992 to cluster around a concept of Europe which is white, racist and much more powerful than any post-war individual state."[95] National identities are being transformed into a "white continentalism."[96] European unity is being defined against an alien culture and around a self-image of European superiority.

Yasmin Alibhai finds this perspective in Mrs. Thatcher's invocation of a common experience rooted in the colonial history of the European nation-states.[97] In her notorious Bruges speech, the former British Prime Minister could confidently and unashamedly declare "the story of how Europeans explored and colonised and yes, without apology—civilised much of the world [to be] an extraordinary tale of talent, skill and courage."[98] As Scott Malcomson reminds us, Pan-European ethnicity was initially forged in violent opposition to non-whites, such as Mongols, Turks, Moors, and then later in opposition to Africans, Asians, New World indigenes, and Jews, who provided an internal Eastern Question.[99] Against other skin colors, "Europeans saw themselves as white, Christian, civilized, and Enlight-

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93 EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 7 (1978).

94 H.A. Wendelbo, What Audience for European Television? 15 (paper presented to the International Television Studies Conference, London, July 10-12, 1986) (paper on file with the *Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal*).

95 *See* Alibhai, *supra* note 28.

96 *Id. See also* Scott L. Malcomson, *Heart of Whiteness: Europe Goes for the Globe*, VILLAGE VOICE LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Mar. 1991, at 14 (arguing that "the only common ground . . . [that Europeans share] is whiteness."). *Id.*

97 *See* Alibhai, *supra* note 28.

98 *Id.*

99 Malcomson, *supra* note 96, at 10. "[T]he Eastern Question was *the* issue for Europe, and still is. Like any other group of expansion-minded humans, Europeans had to define themselves against someone else." *Id.*

ened."[100] In Sivanandan's view,

> [w]e are moving from an ethnocentric racism to a Eurocentric racism, from the different racisms of the different member states to a common, market racism . . . . Citizenship may open Europe's borders to blacks and allow them free movement, but racism which cannot tell one black from another, a citizen from an immigrant, an immigrant from a refugee—and classes all Third World peoples as immigrants and refugees and all immigrants and refugees as terrorists and drug-dealers—is going to make such movement fraught and fancy.[101]

A grave concern is that the European Union will be built on the back of an underclass of migrant and immigrant workers.[102] The current restructuring process is commonly seen in terms of a high-tech revolution—telecommunications networks, electronic cottages, smart buildings—that is bringing about the end of work and the inauguration of a leisure society. The emphasis is on all forms of communications networks. But there is a darker side:

> Besides generating a large supply of high-income professional jobs, this new economic core also needs, directly and indirectly, a wide array of low-wage jobs. Immigration has been a supplier of low-wage and typically powerless workers, a not insignificant fact in [the] strategic centres for control and management of the world economy.[103]

These workers form a "cheap and captive labour force—rightless, rootless, peripatetic and temporary, illegal even—without which post-industrial society cannot run."[104] For these migrants and exiles there is no promise of an end to work. Martin Walker suggests that "[i]t is a dangerous efficiency [that] we have built, that runs so sleekly even as it builds a permanent underclass of the condemned and the unwanted, the drones of Europe."[105] If we are seeing the emergence of postmodern geographies, then these developments are one manifestation.

Mass immigration, displaced persons, refugees, and exiles are a testament to the global-local nexus. "There's a bit of apartheid happening right here among us—in our *democracy*,"

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100 *Id.*

101 A. Sivanandan, *The New Racism*, NEW STATESMAN AND SOCIETY, Nov. 4, 1988, at 9.

102 *Id.*

103 SASKIA SASSEN-KOOB, *Issues of Core and Periphery: Labour Migration and Global Restructuring*, *in* GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING AND TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT 60, 60-61 (Jeffrey Henderson & Manuel Castells eds., 1987).

104 A. Sivanandan, *Rules of Engagement*, NEW STATESMAN AND SOCIETY, Apr. 28, 1989, at 25, 29.

105 Martin Walker, *A Pigsty Without Frontiers*, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 15, 1988.

Gunter Wallraff angrily protests.[106] What cultural or collective identities can these extraterritorial beings lay claim to? Bhikhu Parekh, the former chairman of the British Commission on Racial Equality, writes: "Lacking roots in an ongoing way of life, unable to feel in their bones the deepest joys and agonies of their adopted home, cut off from the social well-springs of meaning and value, their lives lack depth and richness, the commonest source of the experience of sacredness."[107] This is in poignant counterpoint to the appetite for roots, the sense of place and heritage, that now seems to preoccupy the core workforce of Western Europe. How might these nomad identities fit into an ideal of "unity in diversity?" What community is there for them in Europe? How will they be accommodated within social Europe, the citizens' Europe, the Europe of culture?

These questions raise "the deep, the profoundly perturbed and perturbing question of our relationship to others—other cultures, other states, other histories, other experiences, traditions, peoples, and destinies."[108] They raise the question of how our historical relation to others has been transformed into an ontological relation to the Other. Edward Said has described this in terms of the European discourse on Orientalism as "a collective notion identifying 'us' Europeans as against all 'those' non-Europeans . . . [which is] the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures."[109] Said further explains that "Orientalism depends for its strategy on [a] flexible *positional* superiority, which puts the Westerner in a whole series of possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the relative upper hand."[110] Said relates this dimension of empire, this "geographical [disposition of Europe], . . . [to] philosophical and imaginative processes at work in the production as well as the acquisition, subordination, and settlement of space."[111] Out of a polarized geography of "West" and "East" the tension between identity and alterity is produced; one belongs either to one group or to another, one is either in or out. This culminates in a "frightening consolidation of patriotism, assertions of cultural superiority, [and] mecha-

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106 GÜNTER WALLRAFF, LOWEST OF THE LOW 2 (1988).

107 Bhikhu Parekh, *Between Holy Text and Moral Void*, NEW STATESMAN AND SOCIETY, Mar. 24, 1989, at 30.

108 Edward W. Said, *Representing the Colonized: Anthropology's Interlocutors*, 15 CRITICAL INQUIRY 205, 216 (1989).

109 SAID, *supra* note 93, at 7.

110 *Id.*

111 Said, *supra* note 108, at 218.

nisms of control, whose power and ineluctability reinforce . . . the logic of identity."[112] In this discourse of the Other, powerful fantasy elements are being played out. In a discussion of "Otherness" in popular culture, James Donald describes the fear and paranoia at its heart: "Manifest in its racism . . . and its phobias about alien cultures, alien ideologies, and 'enemies within' is the terror that, without the known boundaries, everything will collapse into undifferentiated, miasmic chaos; that identity will disintegrate; that 'I' will be suffocated or swamped."[113]

The European ideal is about an economic area where all barriers have been removed and the principles of solidarity are applied. For some, it is also about coming to terms with social and political barriers. There are also cultural and psychic barriers that are the most profound obstacles to European unity. The most fundamental challenge is to confront the relation between superior and subaltern identity that is embodied in the construction of "Otherness." The question is whether it is possible to create a kind of communication and community that can acknowledge difference, and not simply diversity; whether there is a capacity to use difference as a resource, rather than fear it as a threat. What would be needed is a quite fundamental reconsideration of the insularities and certainties of European identity and continuity. As Homi Bhabha argues, "Where once we could believe in the comforts and continuities of Tradition, today we must face the responsibilities of cultural Translation."[114]

A point, perhaps, to begin with is the experience of exile and immigration. If the objective is genuinely to open frontiers—cultural as well as geographical—then migrant experience could be an important resource. "Exiles cross borders, break barriers of thought and experience."[115] Although exile is a brutalizing experience, there are, indeed, things to be learned from some of its conditions:

> Seeing "the entire world as a foreign land" makes possible originality of vision. Most people are principally aware of one culture, one setting, one home; exiles are aware of at least two, and this plurality of vision gives rise to an awareness of simultaneous dimensions, an awareness that—to borrow a phrase

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[112] Edward W. Said, *Identity, Negation and Violence*, 171 NEW LEFT REV. 46, 56 (1988).

[113] Donald, *supra* note 62, at 44 (*citing* KLAUS THEWELEIT, MALE FANTASIES, 428 (1987)). *See also* Said, *Identity, Negation and Violence*, *supra* note 112.

[114] Homi Bhabha, *Beyond Fundamentalism and Liberalism*, NEW STATESMAN AND SOCIETY, Mar. 3, 1989, at 34, 35.

[115] Edward W. Said, *Reflections on Exile*, 13 GRANTA 157, 170 (1984).

from music—is *contrapuntal*.[116]

The point about this kind of experience is that it could serve to decenter a hegemonic and self-assured Euroculture. Any meaningful European identity must be created out of the recognition of difference, the acceptance of different ethnicities.

Stuart Hall writes that English ethnicity has relevance for a wider European context. "We still have a great deal of work to do to *decouple* ethnicity, as it functions in the dominant discourse, from its equivalence with nationalism, imperialism, racism and the state, which are the points of attachment around which a distinctive British or, more accurately, English ethnicity have been constructed."[117]

III. Conclusion

Culture cannot be an afterthought, something we can turn to when the internal market is completed. In considering the possibilities and the limits of European integration, we are confronted from the outset with questions of collective and cultural identity. Europe is experiencing a process of economic and social transformation that is weakening older institutions and structures. The geography of Europe—economic, political, and cultural—is being refashioned in the context of an evermore apparent global-local nexus. In this process, there is great scope and potential for elaborating new forms of bonding, new senses of community, new attachments and allegiances, and new identities and subjectivities. The idea of a European unification has captured the imagination. The meaning of "Europe" is again a focus of attention. The question is whether Europe can be genuinely reimagined. We must consider the significance of the new information and communications technologies. In what ways might they contribute to a new geographical disposition and new senses of community? How might they facilitate dialogue between communities of interest, communities of difference? It cannot simply be assumed that "television without frontiers" is self-evidently beneficial and integrative. There are frontiers that have nothing to do with trade and markets. It is with imaginary frontiers that we must ultimately come to terms.

The danger is that an oppressive European tradition and history will reestablish itself. The danger is that Europe will remain

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116 *Id.* at 171-72.

117 Stuart Hall, *New Ethnicities*, Black Film, British Cinema 27, 29 (1988).

fixed in the "geographical disposition"[118] that has governed the relation between its sovereign identity and the world of the Other. The danger is that Empire will reassert itself in new ways. And perhaps it already has. For J.G.A. Pocock, "Europe is again an empire concerned for the security of its *limites* . . . the new barbarians being those populations who do not achieve the sophistication without which the global market has little for them and less need of them."[119]

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[118] *See* Said, *supra* note 108.

[119] J.G.A. Pocock, *Deconstructing Europe*, LONDON REV. OF BOOKS, Dec. 19, 1991, at 6, 10.